Civil or Military: Pakistani State is anti India

Since October 1947 Pakistan has been spreading terror in Jammu and Kashmir. From Mohammad Ali Jinnah to Mian Nawaz Sharif every head of state in Pakistan has dreamt of forcibly occupying Jammu and Kashmir by hook or by crook. And from Pundit Jawahar Lal Nehru to Sardar Manmohan Singh every Indian head of state has fallen into Pakistan’s trap.

As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh prepares to walk into another Pakistani minefield, this time in New York, there is a sense of déjà vu. The usual suspects are back to writing how it is in India’s interest to strengthen civilian-democratic forces in Pakistan, how a stable Pakistan is in India’s interest – the same clichéd lines that have time and again been proven wrong. 

India has defeated Pakistan in every war the two countries fought since independence. 1947-48, a desperate Jinnah unable to bear the anguish of inheriting what he termed a `moth eaten Pakistan’ initiated the Direct Action Plan, sending in raiders and Pakistan army regulars into Jammu and Kashmir.

The Indian army gave Pakistan a bloody nose. In 1965, despite Pakistan launching a failed operation Gibralter and then Op Grand Slam, India beat Pakistan in Kargil sector – taking over Pt 13620, in Jammu and Kashmir taking the Haji Pir Pass, defeating Pakistan’s so called superior armour in Asal Uttar – where the Pakistani army abandoned its newly acquired Patton tanks and ran away from battle. And the birth of Bangladesh after the 1971 war and 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war in Indian custody – made Pakistan realise despite their bravado – claiming 1 Pakistani Muslim soldier was worth 10 Indians – the reality was different.

But Indian military might was never in doubt. It is the weak Indian leadership that fails to see through Pakistan’s evil design that is a cause for grave concern.

Before he left for Tashkent, Lal Bahadur Shastri swore he will not return the Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan. That was non negotiable. But when the talks began, Pakistan that had lost the war and India was in control of crucial Pakistani territory, mounted immense pressure on India to return Haji Pir and Pt 13620 in the Kargil sector.

Who created maximum trouble for the Indian camp with his belligerence in Tashkent? Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Veteran journalist Kuldeep Nayar, who had served as Shastri ji’s media advisor and accompanied him to Tashkent recounts how Bhutto continued to put a spoke in the wheels of negotiation.  A lot of pressure was mounted on Shastri ji and he signed the dotted line on the Tashkent Agreement that was so heavily loaded in Paskistan’s favour.

Kuldeep Nayar has written so betrayed was the nation by Shastri ji’s abject surrender that even his wife refused to come on the line and speak to him when he called her from Tashkent after having returned the Haji Pir Pass. Shastri ji passed away that night. When the information reached the Pakistani camp, celebrations broke out.  Veteran journalist Inder Malhotra writes in The Indian Express that when Bhutto heard of the celebrations, he opened the door of his Dacha and asked a senior (Civilian) aide Aziz Ahmed what happened. ``The Bastard has died,’’ said Aziz boisterously. ``Which Bastard died?’’ asked Bhutto and joined the celebrations when he realised Lal Bahadir Shastri had died.

Bhutto blamed Ayub Khan for the 1965 debacle of Pakistan and came on the political centre stage in Pakistan. Six years later Pakistan fought and lost another war with India. This was India’s most comprehensive win against Pakistan. East Pakistan became a new country and India had 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war in our custody.

The same Bhutto, this time as prime minister did not let a final solution happen on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. He may have gone down on his knees and begged for an honourable face saver for Pakistan, but thanks to the weak Indian leadership, lacking a strategic mindset, India lost on the negotiating table what we had won on ground.

Bhutto then returned to Pakistan and swore to wage a thousand year war against India. His daughter Benazir Bhutto proved to be a chip of the old block. After having decisively lost militarily against India,  she pursued  the Bear Trap policy – inflict a thousand cuts to kill the bear. Under  Mian Nawaz Sharif’s  first tenure as PM, Kargil happened even as Vajpayee took the bus of peace to Lahore in February 1999.

Indian foreign policy experts need to get out of the mentality that democracy needs to be strengthened in Pakistan and for that India must engage at the summit level with Pakistan, despite Pakistan state sponsored terror.  Whether a democracy or a dictatorship the psyche of Pakistani leadership is to take Kashmir by force, Indian leadership cannot afford to forget that.

Talk to Pakistan but every interaction should not be summit level and India should not unilaterally make any concessions towards Terroristan, just to strengthen democracy against military rule. There is an old saying in Hindi – Jaise Naag Nath, Vaise Saanp Nath. That is the story of Pakistani leadership whether civil or military.

Two:  it is nowhere written in the Bible, Gita or Koran that every summit level meeting with Pakistan has to be a success. Let there be failures. Let Pakistan understand, it is on notice. Unless Pakistan sponsored terror is checked effectively, there should be no question of any agreement with Pakistan. The under secretaries in the ministries of external affairs of both the countries can meet, but it is not necessary that every meet should be a success or be headed by the prime minister or the foreign minister.

Three: Keep the armed forces on board. After all it is the soldiers who ultimately have to shed blood to honour the prime minister’s commitment to Pakistan. If ground assessment indicates the environment is not conducive for talks, let that be no talks.

History since independence has shown us, Pakistan, at least the State, does not want good ties with India. Pakistan considers India weak, let Dr Manmohan Singh not return the favour.